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already we are seeing abuses that flow from new powers with old or nonexistent accountability mechanisms. "You can trust us" has never been a
safe formula. The debate, the negotiations, and the outcome of the
Canadian responses to the attacks of 9/11 were significantly different from
those in the United States. Whether there is fodder for a worthy debate
regarding the gain or loss of our sovereignty in the process is open for
further discussion. However, the more important question is the one Roach
most fully addresses: The appropriateness of the Canadian response for
Canada.

COLLECTIVE INSECURITY: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS,
UNILA TERALISM, AND THE GLOBAL ORDER. BY IKECHI MGBEOJI
(VANCOUVER: UBC PRESS, 2003) 186 pages'
By Richard Falk 2
Not long ago I read for the first time Toni Morrison's extraordinary
novel Beloved.3 Aside from its literary merit, including the beauty of the
language, the book depicts the harsh cruelties of slavery and its aftermath
with such vividness and integrity that I found the reading experience both
deeply moving and an indictment of my own past ignorance. Not an
ignorance of slavery, of course, but of its depraved detailed practices that
make one aware of the horrifying impacts on the daily lives of AfricanAmericans. On reflection, this usefully disturbing book led me to a better
understanding of how, as a society, we sanitize the ugly realities of the past
so as to dull their sharp edges in the present. One result is that American
society and its citizenry have never truly come to terms with the deep and
persisting moral challenges that slavery continues to pose for present
generations. While reading Beloved, I concluded that every young person
in America, and probably elsewhere, should be required to read and
respond to this work of "fiction," so as to grasp more truly the savage
"reality" of slavery and racism, and why it continues to leave fresh wounds
and defacing scars generations hence.
I had somewhat similar feelings while reading Ikechi Mgbeoji's fine
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book, Collective Insecurity. What, after all, for most of us is "Africa" except
a place where terrible things happen now and earlier, where tribal
encounters so often produce mass atrocities which frequently take turns
toward genocide? Even the most liberal scholarship and media treatments
regard Africa as an abstraction-forbidding and hopeless. Mgbeoji is to be
commended for helping readers toward a more rewarding and illuminating
understanding of the debilitating suffering and strife that has been the fate
of so much of this gigantic continent.
Collective Insecurity is, in its essence, an exceptional work of
engaged scholarship. It does not allow readers to live comfortably within
the condescending and moralizing mainstream framework of African
studies, which looks down its pointed academic nose at Africa from the
commanding heights of western "morality." Mgbeoji awakens us to a series
of uncomfortable truths so well hidden in the lineaments of Eurocentric
African studies, including the deformed historical evolution of colonized
Africa as the organic backdrop to the unfolding of various national
tragedies. As with Morrison, with respect to slavery as an American
practice, every teacher and student of international law should be required
to consider Mgbeoji's deeply felt and carefully reasoned alternative
narrative of the interplay between African realities and western
humanitarianism. Mgbeoji's presentation, above all, challenges the
dominant ahistorical view that the tragedies of Africa are essentially selfinflicted wounds that can only be healed, if at all, by the timely
interventions of the civilizationally superior West. It is smugly selfsatisfying, and deeply misleading, for the leading states to portray
contemporary African conflict as a confirmation of the insistence that
Africa is a continent helplessly victimized by its own indigenous barbarism.
The further African lie is the claim that it was the European presence in the
colonial years that pacified these unruly societies constituted by warring
ethnic communities, and it was the attainment of independence that
allowed these suppressed tensions to rise once more to the surface. Such a
self-serving Euro-American mindset provides a subtle, and sometimes not
so subtle, rationalization of the colonial era, and even hints that the
institution of slavery acted as a sort of "liberation" from tribal Africa.
Reading Mgbeoji with an open mind should make white Westerners
creatively uncomfortable, ill at ease about, if not ashamed of, their selfrighteous advocacy of "humanitarian intervention." At the same time,
Mgbeoji is distinctly not a polemicist, or someone who indulges a kind of
inverted self-righteousness to point an accusing finger at the West. Mgbeoji
is above all interested in exposition and analysis. And he is far from blind
to African complicity. Mgbeoji repeatedly indicts greedy African elites for
contributing to the breakdown of order and civility in a number of African
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countries during the post-independence era. His account is not ideological
or simplistic, but is fully sensitive to the multiple causes of the various
current African tragedies. The analysis moves well beyond criticism in
search of solutions and a better future.
Mgbeoji is dedicated to reconstructing a positive future for Africa
based on respect for international law and for the United Nations (UN),
providing the UN can be freed from the yoke of geopolitics. This substantial
conditional proviso represents a shortcoming of the book, specifically the
tendency to ignore political obstacles that are likely to condition the role of
the UN for the foreseeable future. Because these obstacles are noted, but
their removal neglected, there is a certain legalistic tone present when
Mgbeoji turns from analytic exposition to prescription.4 For instance,
Mgbeoji warns that regional initiatives in Africa set a dangerous precedent
if validated only after their occurrence, rather than in advance as required
by article 53 of the UN Charter. But he gives us no guidance as to what to
do in the likely future event that the Security Council sits on its hands while
genocide unfolds.5
These wider arguments of the book are built around a case study
of the emblematic Liberian crisis of the early 1990s, which is approached
from the perspective of international law and morality, but also with the
benefit of a sense of Liberian history. Mgbeoji indicts the UN, especially its
movers and shakers, for their racialist approaches to African misery, taking
particular note of the blind-eye gaze of the United States in 1994 directed
at the massive genocide taking place in Rwanda. At the same time, Mgbeoji
is sensitive to the difficulties of adapting the UN Charter, designed to
protect the peoples of the world from the recurrence of war between
sovereign states, to the series of challenges associated with imminent and
ongoing humanitarian catastrophes that are essentially situated within the
borders of a sovereign state. The social contract underlying the UN Charter
deliberately prohibits in article 2(7) the Organization from intervening in
matters within the domestic jurisdiction of states unless the circumstances
taking place pose a threat to international peace and security. We need to
recall that when the UN was established in 1945, it was a Westphalian world
in the primary sense that state actors were unwilling to cede control to any
global institution with respect to matters taking place within their borders.
Since 1945, attitudes and practices have changed, influenced by the rise of
international human rights, and by a more aware public opinion that
experiences humanitarian catastrophes in real time thanks to television.
4 See especially supra note 1 at 103-45.
5 See e.g. supra note 1 at 141-42.
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The advent of a multi-faceted globalization has also seemed to make it
artificial to allow states to do whatever they wish to their own citizens. As
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty that
was charged with addressing these issues concluded, there exists on an
international level the responsibility to protect populations exposed to
catastrophic challenges that the territorial government is unwilling or
unable to address. 6
Mgbeoji makes us keenly aware of serious problematic aspects of
this normative evolution, which has taken place mainly in Europe and
North America. For one thing, as with colonialism and the slave trade, only
third-world countries are made the object of this new high-minded phase
of interventionary diplomacy. In this respect, pretexts of humanitarian
motivation are perceived as post-colonial excuses to reassert control over
the same areas of the world that had been ruled by European countries in
the colonial era. Beyond this, there exists a high degree of selectivity with
respect to which humanitarian catastrophes engage the UN system and
command resources, and which are allowed to fester unattended as gaping
wounds. Mgbeoji contrasts the rather intense preoccupation of the UN
during the breakup of Yugoslavia with its shallow concern in responding to
the much deeper and quantitatively greater challenges arising out of the
African reality at the same time. Of course, western commentators have
been critical, especially in the setting of Bosnia, of the failure by the UN to
do anything substantial to protect the victimized population in the face of
Serbian ethnic cleansing.7 Mgbeoji calls our attention to the eagerness of
the United States in 1999 to mount a major intervention under the auspices
of NATO on behalf of the people of Kosovo, without even any proper
authorization from the UN Security Council. Yet, a few years earlier, it
turned its back on Rwanda, and continues to do little about the ongoing
multiple crises in the Great Lakes region of Africa.
Mgbeoji is sensitive to the strategic priorities that drive geopolitics
in directions that are antithetical both to the well-being of people and to
the discipline of a legal framework consisting of rules and standards. In this
regard, he is reluctant to bypass the UN Charter framework for the alleged
purpose of promoting humanitarian claims involving intervention and
encroachment on sovereign rights. Mgbeoji is highly critical of the Kosovo
intervention because it was an undertaking that proceeded without a proper
legal authorization from the Security Council. It is well-established that the
6 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibilityto Protect,
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7 See David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (New York: Simon &
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United States and its allies in Europe, anticipating a veto by Russia and
China, went ahead with their intervention, thereby violating article 53 of
the UN Charter. Mgbeoji believes that Kosovo has established a bad
precedent that gives "coalitions of the willing" virtually a free rein to
intervene where and when they so desire. This well-founded ethos of
suspicion is also relevant to the post-intervention reconstruction process
that usually involves imposing neo-liberal discipline on the "beneficiary" of
humanitarian intervention, as well as opening up a country to exploitative
forms of private investment. Anne Orford makes this argument tellingly in
her powerfully argued book, Reading HumanitarianIntervention,"which is
a useful and reinforcing complement to Collective Insecurity.
Part of the originality of Mgbeoji's approach is to be simultaneously
critical and supportive of international law and of UN procedures
authorizing the use of force. On the one side, he believes that the Security
Council will never be able to do its job properly unless a way is found to
liberate its operations from manipulation by geopolitical forces. Until this
day arrives, opportunistic expansions of interventionary practice should be
generally opposed, and in extreme circumstances subjected to critical
scrutiny. In this regard, Mgbeoji strongly advocates strict adherence to the
guidelines of the UN Charter and international law as ways to constrain the
play of geopolitical forces in world affairs. At the same time, he believes
that the UN should be drastically reformed to take account of developments
of the last several decades that have blurred the line separating
international and intranational warfare. Mgbeoji does not want to suspend
the operation of the existing rules and procedures of regional and global
institutions until the UN is able to fashion responses to pleas on behalf of
vulnerable peoples that are not subject, as is currently the case, to the
vagaries of geopolitics.
The sophisticated and detailed treatment of the Liberian case puts
flesh and blood on these more abstract positions on global policy. Mgbeoji
clearly shows the historical backdrop of the civil strife in Liberia arising
from American encouragement of a black colonizing movement as a selfinterested way of coping with the freeing of the slaves after the American
Civil War. The returning American blacks immediately oppressed and
exploited the majority indigenous, ethnically distinct, African population
of Liberia, while building on the basis of absurd degrees of mimicry, an
African republic that resembled the United States as closely as possible. It
was this abusive minority rule by an alien elite, along with the artificiality
of Liberian borders that had been fixed in the nineteenth century by the
8
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colonial powers with a total disregard for the ethnic contours of the
population, that overlapped Liberia's borders with its neighbours. It was
against such a backdrop in the 1990s that a full-scale international civil war
erupted in which the opposing factions engaged in repeated atrocities,
relied on child soldiers, and subjected the population to a dreadful ordeal
fueled by tribal participation that did not correspond with the borders of
the sovereign state of Liberia.
Despite the severity of the humanitarian crisis, the UN system was
not prepared to act, and when an initiative was finally organized under the
leadership of Nigeria, it assumed a regional character, undertaken in the
name of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). This regional peace force intervened in
Liberia without any prior authorization from the Security Council, thereby
violating article 53 of the UN Charter. The flimsy legal arguments mounted
to rationalize the intervention at the time were to the effect that Samuel
Doe, leader of the Liberian government, had requested the ECOMOG
presence, and that intervention by invitation was acceptable if genuine, that
is, neither coerced nor fraudulent. Mgbeoji was not comfortable with this
legal rationalization, as Doe was himself a leader responsible for numerous
crimes against humanity, and was not in control of more than a fraction,
perhaps less than 10 per cent, of Liberian territory at the time of the
request. The situation was further complicated by Mgbeoji's worry that
Nigeria was an aspiring regional hegemon, and this Liberian precedent
would lend legitimacy to its geopolitical ambitions. The UN Security
Council and UN General Assembly lent a post-hoc validity to the
intervention as a constructive peacekeeping initiative, encouraging the
ECOMOG to continue its efforts, and offering assistance. Again, Mgbeoji is
troubled by such a process of authorizing seemingly illegal uses of force
after the fact, believing that it weakens the struggle to remove legal
discretion from the state to use force except in circumstances of selfdefense as set forth in article 51.
I am not sure how to assess Mgbeoji's argument as a totality. Each
part of the argument is convincing in isolation, but can they stand up when
fitted together as a coherent whole? If the actions of the UN are shaped by
strategic priorities associated with geopolitical ambitions of leading actors,
how can international law exert a consistent influence? If the UN is indicted
for its selective pattern of response to humanitarian crises, especially to the
seeming disadvantage of Africa, should humanitarian claims be rejected
altogether? If the delegation of responsibility to regional actors in Africa
is an expression of the unwillingness of the UN to take on the troubles of the
continent, is this on balance a positive or negative development? Or should
such regional initiatives be evaluated on a case by case basis? In effect, until
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the day that the UN acts in a generally evenhanded and effective manner
with respect to UN Charter guidelines, and revises them to make the
Organization more independent of geopolitical manipulation, what should
be done about unfolding African humanitarian catastrophes? In other
words, what is an optimal interim strategy with respect to these issues? I
think we need a further book by Mgbeoji to help us respond to these issues
that arise in a world in which decision makers and citizens must decide what
to support and oppose.
Mgbeoji calls our attention to some serious deficiencies in the
political structure of contemporary Africa. He is aptly critical of the
artificial construction of African states that flowed from the Berlin
Conference of 1884-85 at which the European colonial powers carved up
Africa with scant regard for the boundaries of ethnic solidarity and
geographic integrity. Mgbeoji's repeated call for "a reconstructed regime
of African statehood" 9 seems highly desirable, except there seems to be no
discernible way to get from the here of artificial statehood to the there of
legitimate statehood.
In conclusion, Mgbeoji is brilliant in laying out the case for
rethinking Africa's place in the world order and specifying how history has
handed the peoples of Africa an unplayable hand in the political game of
life. He is also persuasive in suggesting what needs to be done within Africa
so as to establish better guidelines as to the character of legitimate
governance instead of mere control of the capital city and presidential
mansion, as well as how regional institutions and the United Nations should
carry out peacekeeping operations. For these contributions, we need to
read Collective Insecurity with care. But to escape from a response of
"utopian despair" we need far more guidance as to how to construct a
beneficial future for the peoples of Africa than is provided by Mgbeoji in
this book. Of course, it is unreasonable to ask for everything to be done at
once, and so we impatiently await further reflection and analysis from
Mgbeoji, and applaud his achievements up to this point. This seems like a
reasonable request, as Mgbeoji sets before us a vision of what a
reconstituted African reality will require, and so we seem entitled to ask
how to bring it about, given the formidable difficulties of realization. Until
that time, I fear that "collective insecurity" will continue to shape the near
future as much as it has the present and past.

9 Supra note 1 at xii.

